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ZERO-KNOWLEDGE AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
FROM ACTIONS ON GRAPHS, GROUPS, OR RINGS
DIMA GRIGORIEV AND VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN
Abstract. We propose a general way of constructing zero-knowledge authentication
schemes from actions of a semigroup on a set, without exploiting any specific algebraic
properties of the set acted upon. Then we give several concrete realizations of this
general idea, and in particular, we describe several zero-knowledge authentication
schemes where forgery (a.k.a. impersonation) is NP-hard. Computationally hard
problems that can be employed in these realizations include (Sub)graph Isomorphism,
Graph Colorability, Diophantine Problem, and many others.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we propose a general Feige-Fiat-Shamir-like [3] construction of a zero-
knowledge authentication scheme from arbitrary actions.
Suppose a (partial) semigroup S acts on a set X, i.e., for s, t ∈ S and x ∈ X, one
has (st)(x) = s(t(x)) whenever both sides are defined. For cryptographic purposes, it
is good to have an action which is “hard-to-invert”. We deliberately avoid using the
“one-way function” terminology here because we do not want to be distracted by formal
definitions that are outside of the main focus of this paper. For a rigorous definition of
a one-way function, we just refer to one of the well-established sources, such as [5]. It
is sufficient for our purposes to use an intuitive idea of a hard-to-invert action which is
as follows. Let X and Y be two sets such that complexity |u| is defined for all elements
u of either set. A function f : X → Y is hard-to-invert if computing f(x) takes time
polynomial in |x| for any x ∈ X (which implies, in particular, that complexity of f(x) is
bounded by a polynomial function of |x|), but there is no known algorithm that would
compute some f−1(y) in polynomial time in |y| for every y ∈ f(X).
In our context of actions, we typically consider hard-to-invert functions of the type
fx : s → s(x); in particular, a secret is usually a mapping, which makes our approach
different from what was considered before. This idea allows us to construct a general
Feige-Fiat-Shamir-like zero-knowledge authentication scheme from arbitrary actions,
see the next Section 2. Then, in the subsequent sections, we give several concrete
realizations of this general idea, and in particular, we describe several zero-knowledge
authentication schemes where recovering the prover’s secret key from her public key
is an NP-hard problem. We note however that what really matters for cryptographic
security is computational intractability of a problem on a generic set of inputs, i.e., the
problem should be hard on “most” randomly selected inputs. For a precise definition of
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2the “generic-NP” class, we refer to [8]. Here we just say that some of the problems that
we employ in the present paper, e.g. Graph Colorability, are likely to be generically
NP-hard, which makes them quite attractive for cryptographic applications.
We also address an apparently easier task of forgery (a.k.a. misrepresentation, a.k.a.
impersonation), and show that in most of our schemes this, too, is equivalent for the
adversary to solving an NP-hard problem. To be more specific, by forgery we mean
the scenario where the adversary enters the authentication process at the commitment
step, and then has to respond to the challenge properly.
Finally, we note that there were other attempts at constructing zero-knowledge au-
thentication schemes based on NP-hard problems (e.g. [1], [2]), but these constructions
are less transparent, and it is not immediately clear how and why they work.
2. Two protocols
In this section, we give a description of two generic zero-knowledge authentication
protocols. Here Alice is the prover and Bob the verifier.
2.1. Protocol I. Suppose a set S acts on a set X, i.e., for any s ∈ S and x ∈ X, the
element s(x) ∈ X is well-defined.
(1) Alice’s public key consists of sets S, X, an element x ∈ X, and an element
u = s(x) for some randomly selected s ∈ S, which is her private key.
(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects an element t ∈ S and sends the element
v = t(s(x)) ∈ X, called the commitment, to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c, called the challenge, and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the element t to Bob, and Bob checks if the
equality v = t(u) is satisfied. If it is, then Bob accepts the authentication.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the composition ts to Bob, and Bob checks if the
equality v = ts(x) is satisfied. If it is, then Bob accepts the authentication.
2.2. Protocol II. In this protocol, the hardness of obtaining the “permanent” private
key for the adversary can be based on “most any” search problem; we give some concrete
examples in the following sections, whereas in this section, we give a generic protocol.
(1) Alice’s public key consists of a set S that has a property P. Her private key is
a proof (or a “witness”) that S does have this property. We are also assuming
that the property P is preserved by isomorphisms.
(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects an isomorphism ϕ : S → S1 and sends
the set S1 (the commitment) to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the isomorphism ϕ to Bob, and Bob checks (i) if
ϕ(S) = S1 and (ii) if ϕ is an isomorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends a proof of the fact that S1 has the property P
to Bob, and Bob checks its validity.
The following proposition says that in the Protocol II, successful forgery is equivalent
for the adversary to finding Alice’s private key from her public key, which is equivalent,
3in turn, to giving a proof (or a “witness”) that S does have the property P. The latter
problem can be selected from a large pool of NP-hard problems (see e.g. [4]).
Proposition 1. Suppose that after several runs of steps (2)-(3) of the above Protocol II,
both values of c are encountered. Then successful forgery in such a protocol is equivalent
to finding a proof of the fact that S has the property P.
Proof. Suppose Eve wants to impersonate Alice. To that effect, she interferes with the
commitment step by sending her own commitment S′
1
to Bob. Since she should be
prepared to respond to the challenge c = 0, she should know an isomorphism ϕ′ : S →
S′
1
. On the other hand, since she should be prepared for the challenge c = 1, she should
know a proof of the fact that S′
1
has the property P. Therefore, since ϕ′ is invertible,
this implies that she can produce a proof of the fact that S has the property P. This
completes the proof in one direction.
The other direction is trivial. 
Remark 1. We note that finding a proof of the fact that a given S has a property P is
not a decision problem, but rather a search problem (sometimes also called a promise
problem), so we cannot formally allocate it to one of the established complexity classes.
However, we observe that, if there were an algorithm A that would produce, for any S
having a property P, a proof of that fact in time bounded by a polynomial P (|S|) in
the “size” |S| of S, then, given an arbitrary S′, we could run the algorithm A on S′,
and if it would not produce a proof of S′ having the property P after running over the
time P (|S′|), we could conclude that S′ does not have the property P, thereby solving
the corresponding decision problem in polynomial time.
3. Graph isomorphism
In this section, we describe a realization of the Protocol I from Section 2 (actually,
it also fits in with the Protocol II), based on the Graph Isomorphism problem. We
note that this decision problem is in the class NP, but it is not known to be NP-hard.
Moreover, generic instances of this problem are easy, because two random graphs are
typically non-isomorphic for trivial reasons. However, the problem that we actually
use in the protocol below, is a promise problem: given two isomorphic graphs, find a
particular isomorphism between them. This is not a decision problem; therefore, if we
want to allocate it to one of the established complexity classes, we need some kind of
“stratification” to convert it to a decision problem. This can be done as follows. Any
isomorphism of a graph Γ on n vertices can be identified with a permutation of the
tuple (1, 2, . . . , n), i.e., with an element of the symmetric group Sn. If we choose a set of
generators {gi} of Sn, we can ask whether or not there is an isomorphism between two
given graphs Γ and Γ1, which can be represented as a product of at most k generators
gi. To the best of our knowledge, the question of NP-hardness of this problem has not
been addressed in the literature, but it looks like a really interesting and important
problem.
(1) Alice’s public key consists of two isomorphic graphs, Γ and Γ1, and her private
key is an isomorphism ϕ : Γ→ Γ1.
4(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects an isomorphism ψ : Γ1 → Γ2, and sends
the graph Γ2 (the commitment) to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the isomorphism ψ to Bob, and Bob checks if
ψ(Γ1) = Γ2 and if ψ is an isomorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the composition ψϕ = ψ(ϕ) to Bob, and Bob
checks if ψϕ(Γ) = Γ2 and if ψϕ is an isomorphism.
A couple of comments are in order.
• As it is usual with Feige-Fiat-Shamir-like authentication protocols, steps (2)-(3)
of this protocol have to be iterated several times to prevent a successful forgery
with non-negligible probability.
• When we say that Alice “sends” (or “publishes”) a graph, that means that Alice
sends or publishes its adjacency matrix. Thus, the size of Alice’s public key is
2n2, where n is the number of vertices in Γ.
• When we say that Alice sends an isomorphism, that means that Alice sends a
permutation of the tuple (1, 2, . . . , n), where n is the number of vertices in the
graph in question. Thus, the size of Alice’s private key is approximately n log n.
• When we say that Alice “selects an isomorphism”, that means that Alice selects
a random permutation from the group Sn; there is extensive literature on how
to do this efficiently, see e.g. [11].
Proposition 2. Suppose that after several runs of steps (2)-(3) of the above protocol,
both values of c are encountered. Then successful forgery in such a protocol is equivalent
to finding an isomorphism between Γ and Γ1.
Proof. Suppose Eve wants to impersonate Alice. To that effect, she interferes with
the commitment step by sending her own commitment Γ′
2
to Bob. Since she should
be prepared to respond to the challenge c = 0, she should know an isomorphism ψ′
between Γ and Γ′
2
. On the other hand, since she should be prepared for the challenge
c = 1, she should be able to produce the composition ψ′ϕ = ψ′(ϕ). Since she knows
ψ′ and since ψ′ is invertible, this implies that she can produce ϕ. This completes the
proof in one direction.
The other direction is trivial. 
4. Subgraph isomorphism
In this section, we describe another realization of the Protocol I from Section 2, based
on the Subgraph Isomorphism problem. It is very similar to the Graph Isomorphism
problem, but it is known to be NP-hard, see e.g. [4, Problem GT48]. We also note that
this problem contains many other problems about graphs, including the Hamiltonian
Circuit problem, as special cases. The problem is: given two graphs Γ1 and Γ2, find
out whether or not Γ1 is isomorphic to a subgraph of Γ2. The relevant authentication
protocol is similar to that in Section 3.
(1) Alice’s public key consists of two graphs, Γ and Λ1. Alice’s private key is a
subgraph Γ1 of Λ1 and an isomorphism ϕ : Γ→ Γ1.
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beds Γ2 into a bigger graph Λ2, and sends the graph Λ2 (the commitment) to
Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the subgraph Γ2 and the isomorphism ψ to Bob,
and Bob checks if ψ(Λ1) = Γ2 and if ψ is an isomorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the subgraph Γ2 and the composition ψϕ =
ψ(ϕ) to Bob, and Bob checks whether ψϕ(Γ) = Γ2 and whether ψϕ is an
isomorphism.
Again, a couple of comments are in order.
• The Subgraph Isomorphism problem is NP-complete, see e.g. [4].
• When we say that Alice “sends a subgraph” of a bigger graph, that means
that Alice sends the numbers {m1,m2, . . . ,mn} of vertices that define this sub-
graph in the bigger graph. When she sends such a subgraph together with
an isomorphism from another (sub)graph, she sends a map (k1, k2, . . . , kn) →
(m1,m2, . . . ,mn) between the vertices.
• Compared to the protocol in Section 3, the size of Alice’s public key is somewhat
bigger because Alice has to embed one of the isomorphic graphs into a bigger
graph. The size of Alice’s private key is about the same as in the protocol of
Section 3.
5. Graph colorability
Graph colorability (more precisely, k-colorability) appears as problem [GT4] on the
list of NP-complete problems in [4]. We include an authentication protocol based on
this problem here as a special case of the Protocol II from Section 2. We note that a
(rather peculiar) variant of this problem was shown to be NP-hard on average in [12]
(the latter paper deals with edge coloring though).
(1) Alice’s public key is a k-colorable graph Γ, and her private key is a k-coloring
of Γ, for some (public) k.
(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects an isomorphism ψ : Γ → Γ1, and sends
the graph Γ1 (the commitment) to Bob.
(3) Bob chooses a random bit c and sends it to Alice.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the isomorphism ψ to Bob. Bob verifies that ψ
is, indeed, an isomorphism from Γ onto Γ1.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends a k-coloring of Γ1 to Bob. Bob verifies that this
is, indeed, a k-coloring of Γ1.
Again, a couple of comments are in order.
• It is obvious that if Γ is k-colorable and Γ1 is isomorphic to Γ, then Γ1 is
k-colorable, too.
• When we say that Alice “sends a k-coloring”, that means that Alice sends a set
of pairs (vi, ni), where vi is a vertex and ni are integers between 1 and k such
that, if vi is adjacent to vj, then ni 6= nj.
6• Alice’s algorithm for creating her public key (i.e., a k-colorable graph Γ) is as
follows. First she selects a number n of vertices; then she partitions n into a
sum of k positive integers: n = n1+ . . .+nk. Now the vertex set V of the graph
Γ will be the union of the sets Vi of cardinality ni. No two vertices that belong
to the same Vi will be adjacent, and any two vertices that belong to different
Vi will be adjacent with probability
1
2
. The k-coloring of Γ) is then obvious: all
vertices in the set Vi are colored in color i.
Proposition 3. Suppose that after several runs of steps (2)-(3) of the above protocol,
both values of c are encountered. Then successful forgery is equivalent to finding a
k-coloring of Γ.
The proof is almost exactly the same as that of Proposition 2.
6. Endomorphisms of groups or rings
In this section, we describe a realization of the Protocol II (it also fits in with the
Protocol I) from Section 2 based on an algebraic problem known as the endomorphism
problem, which can be formulated as follows. Given a group (or a semigroup, or a
ring, or whatever) G and two elements g, h ∈ G, find out whether or not there is an
endomorphism of G (i.e., a homomorphism of G into itself) that takes g to h.
For some particular groups (and rings), the endomorphism problem is known to be
equivalent to the Diophantine problem (see [9, 10]), and therefore the decision problem
in these groups is algorithmically unsolvable, which implies that the related search
problem does not admit a solution in time bounded by any recursive function of the
size of an input.
Below we give a description of the authentication protocol based on the endomor-
phism problem, without specifying a platform group (or a ring), and then discuss
possible platforms.
(1) Alice’s public key consists of a group (or a ring) G and two elements g, h ∈ G,
such that ϕ(g) = h for some endomorphism ϕ ∈ End(G). This ϕ is Alice’s
private key.
(2) To begin authentication, Alice selects an automorphism ψ of G and sends the
element v = ψ(h) (the commitment) to Bob.
• If c = 0, then Alice sends the automorphism ψ to Bob, and Bob checks
whether v = ψ(h) and whether ψ is an automorphism.
• If c = 1, then Alice sends the composite endomorphism ψϕ = ψ(ϕ) to Bob,
and Bob checks whether ψϕ(g) = v and whether ψϕ is an endomorphism.
Here we point out that checking whether a given map is an endomorphism (or an
automorphism) depends on how the platform group G is given. If, for example, G is
given by generators and defining relators, then checking whether a given map is an
endomorphism of G amounts to checking whether every defining relator is taken by
this map to an element equal to 1 in G. Thus, the word problem in G (see e.g. [7] or
[8]) has to be efficiently solvable.
7Checking whether a given map is an automorphism is more complex, and there is no
general recipe for doing that, although for a particular platform group that we describe
in subsection 6.1 this can be done very efficiently. In general, it would make sense for
Alice to supply a proof (at the response step) that her ψ is an automorphism; this proof
would then depend on an algorithm Alice used to produce ψ.
Proposition 4. Suppose that after several runs of steps (2)-(3) of the above protocol,
both values of c are encountered. Then successful forgery is equivalent to finding an
endomorphism ϕ such that ϕ(g) = h, and is therefore NP-hard in some groups (and
rings) G.
Again, the proof is almost exactly the same as that of Proposition 2. We also
note that in [6], a class of rings is designed for which the problem of existence of an
endomorphism between two given rings from this class is NP-hard.
A particular example of a group with the NP-hard endomorphism problem is given
in the following subsection.
6.1. Platform: free metabelian group of rank 2. A group G is called abelian (or
commutative) if [a, b] = 1 for any a, b ∈ G, where [a, b] is the notation for a−1b−1ab. This
can be generalized in different ways. A group G is called metabelian if [[x, y], [z, t]] = 1
for any x, y, z, t ∈ G. The commutator subgroup of G is the group G ′ = [G,G]
generated by all commutators, i.e., by expressions of the form [u, v] = u−1v−1uv, where
u, v ∈ G. The second commutator subgroup G′′ is the commutator of the commutator
of G.
Definition 1. Let Fn be the free group of rank n. The factor group Fn/F
′′
n is called
the free metabelian group of rank n, which we denote by Mn.
Roman’kov [10] showed that, given any Diophantine equation E, one can efficiently
(in linear time in the “length” of E) construct a pair of elements u, v of the group M2,
such that to any solution of the equation E, there corresponds an endomorphism of
M2 that takes u to v, and vice versa. Therefore, there are pairs of elements of M2 for
which the endomorphism problem is NP-hard (see e.g. [4, Problem AN8]). Thus, if a
free metabelian group is used as the platform for the protocol in this section, then, by
Proposition 4, forgery in that protocol is NP-hard.
6.2. Platform: Z∗p. Here the platform group is Z
∗
p, for a prime p. Then, since Z
∗
p−1
acts on Z∗p by automorphisms, via the exponentiation, this can be used as the platform
for the Protocol I. In this case, forgery is equivalent to solving the discrete logarithm
problem, by Proposition 4.
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